

any consultation with Congress, without any prior notice to the Congress, a policy that has been in place for 30 years is now summarily being changed with implications that I believe are serious.

When asked by Charles Gibson, on ABC's "Good Morning America," whether the United States had an obligation to defend Taiwan if Taiwan were attacked by China, President Bush said:

Yes, we do, and the Chinese must understand that.

Charles Gibson then asked:

With the full force of the American military?

President Bush responded:

Whatever it took to help Taiwan defend itself.

For almost 30 years, through Republican and Democrat administrations alike, the cornerstone of our approach to policy toward China and Taiwan has been the so-called "one China" policy: There is but one China; Taiwan is a part of China, and the question of Taiwan's future must be settled peacefully.

This policy was laid out in the 1972 Shanghai Communique issued by the United States and China at the end of President Nixon's historic visit. It was reaffirmed in subsequent bilateral communiques—in 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China and again in 1982 on the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

A consistent tenet of this policy is the U.S. expectation that the question of reunification of China and Taiwan will be settled peacefully. We have never stated what the United States would do if Beijing attempted to use force to reunify Taiwan with the mainland—until today. We have not stated it in the course of Republican and Democrat administrations alike because we understood the danger of doing so.

We have been deliberately vague about what the circumstances might be under which we would come to Taiwan's defense, not only to discourage Taiwan from drawing us in by declaring independence but also to deter a Chinese attack by keeping Beijing guessing as to what the response might be.

Sometimes some people have talked about trying to reduce that ambiguity and simplify it and simply say, of course we would come to their defense. But if you do that, you invite a set of consequences that might carry with it its own set of dangers, and you may lose control of the capacity to make a determination about what has happened and what the circumstances really are to which you need to respond.

President Bush's comments this morning on "Good Morning America" suggest that the administration has decided to abandon the so-called strategic

ambiguity. If so, the President has made a major policy change with absolutely no consultation with the Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed Services Committee, the Intelligence Committee, or the leadership of the Congress.

In my view, it is a policy change that serves neither our interests nor Taiwan's. Any situation which results in the use of force across the Taiwan Strait is unlikely to be simply black and white, as clear as can be. The Tonkin Gulf is a classic example of that. To this day, people debate over whether or not there really was an attack on the Maddox and the Turner Joy, and whether or not there was an appropriate response under those circumstances.

The scenarios which could lead to the use of force and the conditions under which the United States might respond are simply too variable to lend themselves to a simple, clear declaration such as the declaration made by the President this morning.

For example, if China attacked in response to what it sees as a Taiwanese provocation, would we then respond? Apparently so, according to President Bush. Or if Taiwan declared independence, and China responded militarily, would we then come to Taiwan's defense? Have we given Taiwan a card it wanted all along, which is the capacity to know that no matter what it does, the United States would, in fact, be there to defend it?

The answer to that question is the reason that we have carried this ambiguity through President Ford, President Carter, President Reagan, President Bush, the President's father, and President Clinton.

In a subsequent interview on CNN, the President reiterated that we maintain the "one China" policy, and he hopes Taiwan will not declare independence. But he remained vague as to what we would do if Taiwan did declare independence and China attacked.

To remove the strategic ambiguity runs the risk of decreasing Taiwan's security rather than increasing it and of eliminating the flexibility that we will need to determine how to respond in any given situation.

Notwithstanding President Bush's efforts to clarify that the United States does not want Taiwan to declare independence, the new policy has the automatic impact, if it is in place, and if it is the declaration that was made, of emboldening Taiwan and, frankly, reducing our control over events.

Although I have argued that we need to inject more clarity into our engagement with China, I personally believe that on this question our interests and Taiwan's are better served by the ambiguity that has existed and would be better served by maintaining it. It not only deters a Chinese attack, but it discourages Taiwan from misreading what the United States might do.

President Bush has said that the United States has an obligation to defend Taiwan. Certainly we want to help Taiwan preserve its thriving democracy and robust, growing economy. I have said previously that I think this is enough of a message to the Chinese, that no American President could stand idly by and watch while that democracy that has been gained is set back, by force or otherwise. Nevertheless, we need to press both Taipei and Beijing to reinvigorate the cross-strait dialogue, without any misinterpretations about our role.

So let us be clear: The Taiwan Relations Act does not commit the United States to come to the defense of Taiwan in the event of an attack. The Taiwan Relations Act commits us to provide Taiwan with the necessary military equipment to meet its legitimate self-defense needs. The arms package that the Bush administration just approved for Taiwan, I believe, is the right mix and the right measure, and it will significantly increase the Taiwanese defensive capacities. I support that package.

It may be the case that we would send American forces ultimately to Taiwan's defense if there were an attack, but that decision should not be made by an American President in advance during a television interview.

A decision of this magnitude, which holds the potential for risking the lives of American military men and women, should be made in response to the circumstances at the moment, on the ground, in the air, and, most importantly, in consultation with the Congress of the United States in the due performance of its responsibilities with respect to the engagement of our forces overseas.

Madam President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.

Mrs. LINCOLN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The remarks of Mrs. LINCOLN pertaining to the introduction of S. 775 are located in today's RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

Mrs. LINCOLN. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BYRD). Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDERS FOR THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2001

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it adjourn until the hour of 10 a.m. on

Thursday, April 26. I further ask unanimous consent that on Thursday, immediately following the prayer, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed expired, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and the Senate then begin a period of morning business until 11 a.m. with Senators speaking for 10 minutes each with the following exceptions: Senator THOMAS or his designee from 10 to 10:30, and Senator DURBIN or his designee from 10:30 to 11 a.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. NICKLES. For the information of all Senators, it is hoped that the Senate can begin consideration of S. 149, the Export Administration Act, at approximately 11 a.m. Therefore, votes could occur during tomorrow's session. In addition, the negotiations on the education bill are continuing, and it is still hoped that an agreement can be reached prior to the end of the week.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. NICKLES. If there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask unanimous consent the Senate

stand in adjournment under the previous order.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 3:56 p.m., adjourned until Thursday, April 26, 2001, at 10 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate April 25, 2001:

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

LOU GALLEGOS, OF NEW MEXICO, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, VICE PAUL W. FIDDICK, RESIGNED.

MARY KIRTLEY WATERS, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, VICE ANDREW C. FISH, RESIGNED.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

TIMOTHY J. MURIS, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE A FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM OF SEVEN YEARS FROM SEPTEMBER 26, 1994, VICE ROBERT PITOFKY, RESIGNED.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

LEE SARAH LIBERMAN OTIS, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, VICE MARY ANNE SULLIVAN, RESIGNED.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

CLAUDE A. ALLEN, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, VICE KEVIN L. THURM, RESIGNED.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

PAT PIZZELLA, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR, VICE PATRICIA WATKINS LATTIMORE.

IN THE AIR FORCE

THE FOLLOWING NAMED UNITED STATES AIR FORCE RESERVE OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT AS CHIEF OF AIR

FORCE RESERVE AND FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTIONS 8038 AND 601:

TO BE LIEUTENANT GENERAL

MAJ. GEN. JAMES E. SHERRARD III, 0000

THE FOLLOWING AIR NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICERS FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE RESERVE OF THE AIR FORCE TO THE GRADES INDICATED UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 12203:

TO BE MAJOR GENERAL

BRIG. GEN. GREGORY B. GARDNER, 0000
BRIG. GEN. ROBERT I. GRUBER, 0000
BRIG. GEN. CRAIG R. MCKINLEY, 0000
BRIG. GEN. JAMES M. SKIFF, 0000

TO BE BRIGADIER GENERAL

COL. RICHARD W. ASH, 0000
COL. THOMAS L. BENE, JR., 0000
COL. PHILIP R. BUNCH, 0000
COL. CHARLES W. COLLIER, JR., 0000
COL. RALPH L. DEWSNUP, 0000
COL. CAROL ANN FAUSONE, 0000
COL. SCOTT A. HAMMOND, 0000
COL. DAVID K. HARRIS, 0000
COL. DONALD A. HAUGHT, 0000
COL. KENCIL J. HEATON, 0000
COL. TERRY P. HEGGEMEIER, 0000
COL. RANDALL E. HORN, 0000
COL. THOMAS J. LIEN, 0000
COL. DENNIS G. LUCAS, 0000
COL. JOSEPH E. LUCAS, 0000
COL. FRANK PONTELANDOLFO, JR., 0000
COL. RONALD E. SHOOPMAN, 0000
COL. BENTON M. SMITH, 0000
COL. HOMER A. SMITH, 0000
COL. ANNETTE L. SOBEL, 0000
COL. CLAIR ROBERT H. ST. III, 0000
COL. REX W. TANBERG, JR., 0000
COL. MICHAEL H. WEAVER, 0000
COL. LAWRENCE H. WOODBURY, 0000